0.16 William Breit Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, Journal of Law and Economics, 1974.

{ ha problem make doe }	0.22
{ liability damage rule fisher }	0.16
{ antitrust cartel case price }	0.14
{ resource output production property }	0.07

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