0.26 Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation or "Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, 1990.

{ optimal model expected level }	0.28
{ regulation regulatory regulated industry }	0.26
{ contributions committee house congressional }	0.07
{ variable variables results significant }	0.05

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