0.33 Mark A. Cohen, Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard, Journal of Law and Economics, 1987.

{ environmental enforcement compliance pollution }	0.33
{ optimal model expected level }	0.13
{ supra note law econ }	0.09
{ liability damages rule damage }	0.07

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