0.26 Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation or "Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, 1990.

{ model offer probability agent }	0.26
{ regulation regulatory utility price }	0.26
{ political committee interest vote }	0.12
{ variable coefficient model regression }	0.07

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