

## Review Essay

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### Cognitive Storyworlds

**David Herman.** *Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 477. \$60.00 cloth.

The study of narrative will always depend upon what is being discovered or at least thought about in the study of mind. Philosophy, psychology, and linguistics have long provided the models from which conclusions about narrative were drawn, and the history of structuralist narratology provides perhaps the clearest example of this syncretic process. David Herman's *Story Logic* is an encyclopedic attempt to orient current narrative research in cognitive science. Herman argues that narrative should be considered as an element of cognitive science and not just related by analogy to the study of other mental phenomena. Drawing upon an immense range of sources in narrative theory, cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy, *Story Logic* seeks to provide a systematic account of the "storyworlds," or models of the represented worlds created in storytelling.

The book is divided into two parts: narrative "micro-" and "macrodesigns." Moving from the most particular elements of storyworlds to the most general, each chapter builds upon the categories introduced previously. There are nine total: the five microdesigns are "States, Events, and Actions"; "Action Representations"; "Scripts, Sequences, and Stories"; "Participant Roles and Relations"; and "Dialogues and Styles." The macrodesigns of the second section are "Temporalities," "Spatializations," "Perspectives," and "Contextual Anchorings." As Herman recognizes, most of the work done in narrative comprehension in the cognitive sciences has focused on understanding how very simple narratives, such as brief news reports, are processed. Criticisms of cognitive-oriented narrative analyses often suggest that, while schema- and frame-based approaches may possibly reveal something about elementary narrative comprehension, they are incommensurable with the understanding of complex literary narrative. Herman argues the opposite—only the latter can reveal the true complexities of narrative production; and he does not shy away from complex narratives: *Finnegans Wake*

and *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge* are among the wide range of “tutor texts” he uses to illustrate his points. I will review the argument of each chapter before further discussing where Herman’s work fits in with the current scholarship in narrative theory and some of the possibilities and problems suggested by his approach.

Herman’s main descriptive category is the *storyworld*, which he defines as a synthesis of the concepts of *story* and *discourse* that “better captures what might be called the ecology of narrative interpretation” (13). The most basic elements of the mental representations that compose a storyworld are states, events, and actions. Beginning with a reference to Gérard Genette’s idea that an action or event immediately determines a story, “because there is a transformation, a transition from an earlier state to a later and resultant state” (*Narrative Discourse Revisited* 19, qtd. in Herman 27), Herman extends Genette’s observation in light of recent research in sociolinguistics and pragmatics.

The premise of this first chapter is that inferences about events are an aspect of cognition prior to or independent from language. Herman synthesizes Mark Turner’s argument about the structuring property of narrative imagining with the idea that events within a storyworld are goal-directed actions, and expands upon this formulation with concepts taken from linguistic and philosophical research in verb semantics. The essential idea drawn from this research is that semantic properties encode themselves into grammatical usage. To test his ideas, Herman briefly analyzes four genres: epic, psychological novels, ghost stories, and news reports. He defines “genre” as a series of preference rankings for event and coding types, distinguishing between “the *historical existence* of particular genres, on the one hand, and the *semantic and pragmatic properties* underlying people’s intuitions that they are in the presence of a given genre, on the other” (35, original emphases). The ghost story, for example, has the following semantic preference ranking for events: “Activities > states > accomplishments > achievements” (37). Herman further refines the concept of an “event” with reference to William Frawley’s distinction between stative and nonstative events in *Linguistic Semantics*: “for statives, the scope of the event is the event as a totality, whereas for actives [a particular kind of nonstative event] the scope of the event includes its components, or constituent subprocesses” (40). The next refinement of the event, state, and action concept comes from Talmy Givón’s *English Grammar*. Givón includes all three categories as constituent elements of “propositional frames”: verbs that constitute the “semantic core of clauses” (Herman 43). Herman concludes the chapter by observing that the “discourse perspective” differs from early narratological models that made an analogy between sentence-level syntactical analyses and narrative structure (49). Thus, the level of abstraction of discourse analysis is more commensurable with narrative discourse.

The second chapter further elaborates on “action representations,” “microdesigns that commonly surface in written narratives as verbal or least verb-

like expressions" (53). Herman argues that the categories of actions and action structures are capable of explaining what Arthur Danto termed "atomic narratives," a series of statements containing a beginning, middle, and end in which a general law covers the causal relation between them (251). The "molecular" narratives that cannot be reduced to a general law are treated in the following chapter, as is G. H. von Wright's related distinction between action descriptions and biographies (54). Action sequences become stories by the modeling of action structures, which are "anchored in broad cognitive principles and dispositions" (83). Herman believes that classical narratology, without the benefit of modern research in the cognitive sciences, was not adequately equipped to explain how this modeling occurs and thus to explain what differentiated narrative from the presentation of sequences. He elaborates upon this process in the next chapter, "Scripts, Sequences, and Stories."

The difference between stereotyped sequences of events or scripts and narrative is explained here (86). Though the former are components of stories and of narratives, only those that possess *narrativehood* are narratives. This binary predicate is determined by identifiable participants with "certain beliefs about the world seeking to accomplish goal-directed plans" (90). The separate category of *narrativity* refers to a range of attributes, a scalar predicate, that determine how closely a story adheres to the properties of all stories, defined by a mixture of "expectation and transgression of expectation" or "canonicity and breach" (91). Herman explores both the structuralist approach to narrative sequences and work done in cognitive science, with Roger Schank and Robert P. Abelson's work in *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding* providing the best-known example. After a discussion of the different modalities of scripts and their relation to the concept of narrativity, Herman explores synchronic versus diachronic approaches to script (and narrative) analysis. *Story Logic* is primarily concerned with a synchronic approach, showing how narrative is a property of mind; but the diachronic approach, which shows how script use changes over time, is also necessary for the identification of generic conventions (110).

The last two chapters of the "Microdesigns" section are "Participant Roles and Relations" and "Dialogues and Styles." The first argues that the concept of *participant*, an element or individual "involved in processed encoded in narrative discourse" (115), can be expanded to include the more general concept of character and also as a distinguishing property from the *circumstances* in which processes occur. These concepts are analogous to the *actants* and *circonstants* established by A.-J. Greimas and Lucien Tesnière in *Structural Semantics* and *Éléments de syntaxe structurale* respectively. Herman outlines how the actantial roles assigned by Greimas to narrative structure overlap with each other and are not easily applicable to a wide variety of genres (133). The functionalist linguistics of M. A. K. Halliday's *Language as Social Semiotic* and *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* is used to expand the concept of the actant into that of the participant. In

particular, Herman makes an analogy between functionalist and logico-semantic explanations of how meaning constrains syntax<sup>1</sup> and the preference rankings which constrain genres.

Showing that he is far away indeed from Schank and Abelson's restaurant scripts and Cyrus Vance-simulators, Herman devotes the first part of his chapter on dialogue to an analysis of the "Mutt and Jute" episode of *Finnegans Wake*. After showing how participants enact sequences derived from action structures composed of events, he turns to the means and performance of participants' speech acts. He uses Paul Grice's pragmatic theories about coherence not being a property that inheres in texts but rather one that emerges from the relations between sentences that reside in the minds of their interpreters to show that the dialogue instructs the reader in the "contextual parameters" needed to make sense of the narrative as a whole (175). The chapter's second section, on style, is devoted to an analysis of Edith Wharton's *The House of Mirth*, and Herman sets out to explain the problem of style shifts within the narrative. After commenting that Mikhail Bakhtin's separation of novelistic discourse from language in general set a bad precedent, he notes that recent advances in linguistics permit a fuller realization of Bakhtin's sociological stylistics than was available at the time (195). Herman concludes that "fictional styles invite reflection on how discourse is an instrument that can either work against or reinforce patterns of conflict—more or less unquestioned hierarchies and antagonisms—operative in society at large" (207).

There are four "Macrodesigns" in Herman's schema: "Temporalities," "Spatializations," "Perspectives," and "Contextual Anchorings." In the first, he uses the concept of *polychrony* to account for "narration that exploits indefiniteness to pluralize and delinearize itself" (219). Expanding upon Genette's concepts of duration, frequency, and order in story and discourse time, Herman seeks to account for narratives with "fuzzy ordering," which have a "reflexive modeling system" (218). In other words, whereas Genette's category of anachronies can account for proleptic and analeptic sequences, his concept of *achrony* or "timelessness" does not adequately describe the aforementioned indefinite sequences. Herman ascribes a special significance to these fuzzy ordering narratives, stating that they permit "cognizing events [that] resist (or altogether deny) chronological ordering" (220). Significantly, two of his examples are narratives of the Holocaust: Anna Segher's "*Der Ausflug der toten Mädchen*" and D. M. Thomas's *The White Hotel*. Segher's story is an example of "humble narration": a narrative that prompts readers to "fashion inferential chains [. . .] but simultaneously undercuts readers' tendency to construe causes as anterior to effects" (228). The indefinite mode of Atom Egoyan's film of Russell Banks's *The Sweet Hereafter* is "desperate narration," a narrative whose temporal indeterminacy positions itself in contrast to the reductively linear effects of crisis (237). Finally, *The White Hotel* serves as an example of how "magical narratives," which "fuse 'possible worlds, spaces, systems' that would be irreconcilable in

other fictional modes, situating themselves on a 'liminal territory between or among those worlds—in phenomenal and spiritual regions where transformation, metamorphosis, and dissolution are common'" (Zamora and Ferris 6, qtd. in Herman 251). The main category of temporal indefiniteness in "magical narration" is ontological transgression, involving historical *paralepses*.<sup>2</sup>

Herman's consideration of the role in space in narrative compares and updates the approaches to the issue by Roland Barthes and Greimas. He describes six key concepts taken from linguistic inquiry into the concept of space: deictic shift; the distinction between figure and ground; regions, landmarks, and paths; the distinction between topological and projective locations; the deictic functions of motion verbs; and the distinction between the what and where systems of spatial cognition (270-71). An analysis of Flann O'Brien's *The Third Policeman*, which shows how "narratives enable (or in some cases inhibit) 'cognitive mapping,' the process by which things and events are mentally modeled as being located somewhere else in the world" (265), concludes the chapter. "Cognitive mapping," in particular, is a concept which has been widely deployed in the growing literature that examines the concept of space in narrative from a non-cognitively oriented perspective; and the convergences between these approaches and Herman's are a likely area for further inquiry.

Genette uses the term "focalization" to describe the perspectives from which narrative information is presented. Omniscient narration has zero focalization, or no unique perspective, whereas other narratives can be internally focalized with fixed, variable, or multiple perspectives. External focalization is where no narrative information is given about the internal states of the narrator; Genette's examples are Dashiell Hammett's novels and Hemingway short stories such as "The Killers" and "Hills like White Elephants" (*Narrative Discourse* 189-90). In the "Perspectives" chapter, Herman reviews Genette's and other narratologists' use of the concept of "focalization" and concludes that "hypothetical focalization, which entails the use of hypotheses, framed by the narrator or character, about what might be or might have been seen or perceived—if only there were someone who could have adopted the requisite perspective on the situations and events at issue" can only be explained in terms of linguistic and philosophical concepts developed after the classical narratological formulations (303). A number of texts are called upon to illustrate the concept of hypothetical focalization, ranging from *As I Lay Dying* to the "concealed hypotheticality" of Haven Gillespie's "Santa Claus is Coming to Town." Semantic theory, especially possible-world semantics, is necessary to account for the referential problems presented by perspectival shifts in narrative.

The final chapter, "Contextual Anchorings," further extends the importance of the concept of reference by describing two separate types of mental models: one which is a totality of the represented storyworld and the other which represents the world in which the storyworld is interpreted. "Contextual anchoring" is the

“process [...] whereby a narrative, in a more or less explicit and reflexive way, asks its interpreters to search for analogies between the representations contained within these two classes of mental models” (331). The concept of *deixis*, which “refers to all resources of language that anchor it to essential points in context” (332),<sup>3</sup> provides the basis for Herman’s exploration of situatedness in narrative production. The main example explored is the phenomenon of the “narrative You,” or second-person narration, which Herman examines in particular in Edna O’Brien’s *A Pagan Place*. The conclusion argues that critics of a “universal narratology”<sup>4</sup> must “demonstrate that fundamentally different cognitive processes are indeed involved during the comprehension of narratives in different speech genres” (370).

The most immediate points of reference for Herman’s work in narrative studies are the scholars he acknowledges in his introduction, Marie-Laure Ryan and Lubomír Doležel. Ryan’s *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* and Doležel’s *Heterocosmica* both share Herman’s desire to apply concepts from semantics and the philosophy of language to the problems of narrative analysis.<sup>5</sup> It was Herman himself who used the term “postclassical narratology” to describe his project in the PMLA article from which the third chapter of *Story Logic* is adapted (Herman, “Scripts”), and the “classical narratology” of Barthes, Greimas, and Genette is another major source. He is very thorough about outlining his position vis-à-vis these thinkers, and I now want to consider some related work which is not as immediately apparent.

Theorists such as David Bordwell and Norman Holland have been applying insights from the cognitive sciences to film and literary study for nearly two decades. There are now enough people working on these intersections that there is an entire subgenre of bibliographic essay designed to catalog developments in the field.<sup>6</sup> Though these works resist categorization, most of them share a concern with applying what is being discovered about mental processes to literary studies. Some suggest that cognitive science displaces or even disproves many of the tenets of poststructuralism—both Bordwell’s and Holland’s work makes this claim. Others write that a cognitive-oriented approach is actually more materialist than the formalisms of deconstruction and new historicism.<sup>7</sup> The central argument of *Story Logic* is that “classical” narratological studies need updating in light of recent research into mental behavior to be able to explain certain narrative properties. Critics employing cognitive concepts typically draw their material from either the cognitive linguistics associated with George Lakoff or the writers in the broad field of evolutionary psychology, of whom John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, Terence Deacon, and (to a lesser extent) Steven Pinker are the most frequently cited. Though he does not directly employ any evolutionary psychological concepts,<sup>8</sup> the rigor of Herman’s application of cognitive linguistic and sociolinguistic concepts distinguishes it from much work in the field. A frequent criticism leveled at cognitive approaches to cultural analysis is that they are essentially close readings

with an unnecessarily complex conceptual apparatus attached. Herman recognizes and addresses this problem directly by stating that he wants to provide an “*interestingly narrow* account of core principles of storyworld design” (86, original emphases). “Narrow” means that Herman’s ideas can be tested and falsified, and “interesting” in this sense means that any errors in his account are productive ones, as “to work toward sharpening the debate about the nature and scope of narrative imaginings” (87). I believe *Story Logic* succeeds in these goals, and I will examine a few of its interestingly narrow claims.

One of the most prominent of the cognitive-linguistically oriented literary theorists is Mark Turner, about whose *The Literary Mind* Herman wrote a review-essay (“Parables”). In it, Herman applauds Turner for drawing a distinction between the “*idea* of mind and an *ideology* of mind” (21, original emphases). The definition of “ideology” that he cites in this context is the Althusserian “imaginary relations to real things”; and he also makes use of the concept of “interpellation,” Althusser’s term for an ideological system’s naming or “hailing” of a subject within its rules of discourse, to introduce a series of objections from various poststructuralist, Marxist, and New Historical positions about Turner’s use of the concept of “mind.” I agree with Herman that Turner’s work and literary approaches in general that refer to the concept of “mind” are not *eo ipso* endorsing “inviolable inwardness, unchanging essence, and predetermined identity” (20). In his criticism of Turner’s position about the relations between conceptual structure, ideology, and parable, Herman writes that Turner is wrong to view fixity of belief as irrelevant to the “determination of category membership,” or the conceptual structuring that takes place in the mind (34). This notion of “ideology” as a rigidity of interpretation or fixity of belief carries over into *Story Logic*.

Herman applauds the fact that literary theorists have begun to use “Post-Saussurean scholarship on discourse and style” (195). In his discussion of Bakhtin’s work on the question of “sociological stylistics,” arguably the most influential on subsequent explorations of the subject in literary studies, Herman writes that “Bakhtin set an unfortunate precedent [. . .] by divorcing the study of novelistic style in particular from the broader enterprise of analyzing style in language generally” (194).<sup>9</sup> For Herman, sociolinguistic research in discourse analysis and stylistics is not only commensurable with the study of complex literary genres such as the novel, it is necessary. Bakhtin’s and others’ immediate objection to this line of reasoning is that literary discourse, especially in the novel, is so much more complicated than the conversational fragments studied by sociolinguistics that no useful comparisons can be drawn. As I have noted, Herman’s pursuit of the narrowly interesting criterion for his readings leads him to select complicated literary narratives as his test cases, Wharton’s *House of Mirth* in this case. A partial conclusion is that his reading “does suggest the pertinence of fictional discourse representations for the study of how language imbricates itself with issues of power and ideology.” Citing Norman Fairclough’s *Language and*

*Power and Critical Discourse Analysis* on how ideology can function as a “language structure” or “language event,” Herman states that uses of the passive voice to obscure agency (“mistakes were made”) or the situational restrictions of a police interview are examples of how ideology intrudes upon both grammatical choice and spoken context. Is ideology a series of “patterns of conflict—more or less unquestioned hierarchies and antagonisms—operative in society at large” (207)?

For Bakhtin, all spoken discourse is ideology, all speakers ideologues, all utterances ideologemes (*Dialogic* 429). The pejorative sense of the term originates with Napoleon’s denunciation of Destutt de Tracy and other ideologues and was famously developed as a mode of critique by Marx. In the twentieth century, there has been a profusion of explorations of the term, ranging from the rigid conceptual framework definition employed by Daniel Bell and Francis Fukuyama<sup>10</sup> to the sense of ideology being something that is adaptable and that permeates all aspects of social being.<sup>11</sup> An example of where Herman’s usage of “ideology” might be profitably expanded from its Althusserian conceptual structure is in the “Temporalities” chapter, where he discusses a series of narratives that use various strategies for distorting sequences of events. Specifically, Herman argues that the “hyperlinearization” of German history caused by the *völkisch* Nazi ideology—that diverse events were reinterpreted according to the unicausal paradigm of racial and ethnic conflict—is countered by the “multiple lines of causation” in Segher’s “*Der Ausflug der toten Mädchen*” (236). Stories within this explanatory system function as ideologemes. The notion that “stories define the order of the real in both of the two operative senses: they define the domain of situations and events that counts as reality, and they define what modes of sequencing, what chains of cause and effect, are endemic to or indicative of that domain” (234-35) resembles Althusser’s assertion that “political reality can be exhaustively described by reference to structures” (Sypnowich 3.4) in its positivist insistence on the self-referential and autologous relation between historical event and narrative imagining.<sup>12</sup> I would argue instead that ideology serves as a set of conditions on the transformations of narrative, a series of boundary conditions which are operative at a different level of abstraction than story-formation.

Ideology’s relation to narrative production is a subject of such complexity that it may forever elude uncontested formulation. Another important aspect of Herman’s work is its reliance on wide-ranging and scrupulously researched linguistic evidence. There are a number of interpretive debates surrounding the cognitive linguistics, functional linguistics, and sociolinguistics that Herman draws upon which are relevant to his ultimate argument. All of these approaches have distinguished themselves in whole or part from the approaches associated primarily with Noam Chomsky. Cognitive linguistics is perhaps the clearest example of this, with George Lakoff specifically attributing its development to his disagreement with Chomsky’s claims about “autonomous syntax.”<sup>13</sup> Halliday’s

brand of functional linguistics considers the text as the unit of analysis, rather than the sentence; and William Labov's sociolinguistics was founded at least in partial reaction to his idea that "Chomsky would deliberately exclude all social variation from the subject matter of linguistics" (262). The debates surrounding these controversies are complex, and it is doubtful that all of these positions are mutually exclusive. There is an evident attraction for the narrative theorist in linguistic programs that study texts as the unit of discourse, focus on embodiment and situatedness as crucial components of meaning-formation, and explore the specifically social contexts of linguistic discourse. The Chomskyan paradigm, on the other hand, despite a profusion of generative-transformational narrative grammars in the 1960s and 1970s, would seem to contribute less, with its formal emphasis on syntactical properties. There are areas of Herman's storyworld construction that I feel could further benefit from concepts drawn from the Chomskyan framework.

One immediate example of this is what might be termed the ontological properties of narrative for Herman. What is the relation between narrative and language? The answer is that language is an "interface between narrative and cognition" (5). Whereas the *theories* of language and narrative are both modular components of cognitive science, language itself is not an autonomous cognitive function but is anterior to narrative. Herman cites Turner's argument in *The Literary Mind* that language use originated through principles of narrative imaging or parable, rather than genetic specialization (Turner 140-68, qtd. in Herman 379 n.18). The strongest argument for Chomsky's notion of Universal Grammar is the "poverty of stimulus": that children are able to distinguish grammatical from nongrammatical sentences on the basis of a limited and conflicting exposure and that this ability must thus be an aspect of cognitive development triggered by exposure to language (Chomsky 43). Herman rejects the idea that narratives have syntactical properties in this matter, stating that all "coding strategies" are permissible at the local level of narration (50). He substitutes the idea of "preference rankings" that determine the permissible sequences of states, events, and actions that compose narratives. While it is entirely acceptable that the narrative property would have different characteristics than language, it is an open question whether, if narrative is a modular property anterior to language, it must develop on the basis of the same limited evidence and thus be constrained by the same measure of lower-level syntacticality.

A final question for further exploration is the attribution of agency to narratives and the texts that comprise them. In the "Dialogues and Styles" chapter where he analyzes the "Mutt and Jute" dialogue from *Finnegans Wake*, Herman writes that "Joyce's text suggests that discourse analysts cannot and should not hope to recover communicative content through a simple algorithm assorting sets of utterances into topics and comments" (192-93). This is just one example of the phrasing, which is more or less constant throughout, that suggests that the text itself

has the power to do things. Norman Holland has long argued that psychological evidence shows that meaning itself does not reside in the text but rather is formed in the mind of the reader.<sup>14</sup> The point is not answered by substituting “the reader feels” for “the text does”; the narrative theorist has to come to terms with the question of whether narrative-production and narrative-comprehension are reciprocal processes. If they are not, then the conceptual framework used to describe one will not necessarily be successful in describing the other. This could very well be an example of one of Herman’s “narrow” propositions that could be tested by diachronic investigation into the different receptions afforded to various narratives at distinct time periods.

Herman’s goal—of bringing to bear new insights into narrative analysis from research done in cognitive science—is necessary for the continued health of the narratological project, and *Story Logic* succeeds in showing why. From the density and range of reference alone, this work provides an important reference to scholars working in the broad areas of narrative analysis. In addition, Herman’s applications of his principles offer wide-ranging insight into the texts being discussed. Combined especially with detailed historical analyses, I feel that the framework provided in *Story Logic* will serve as a major conceptual reference point for future narrative inquiry.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> This notion is considered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson as the major problem with what they consider to be the “autonomous” syntax of Noam Chomsky’s linguistic theories, which they argue are “entirely inconsistent with empirical research on mind and language coming out of second-generation cognitive science” (279), a point to which I will return.

<sup>2</sup> Genette’s term for an excess of narrative information (*Narrative Discourse* 195).

<sup>3</sup> Herman’s source for this definition of “deixis” is Frawley’s *Linguistic Semantics* (274-83).

<sup>4</sup> Brian Richardson’s claim that a thorough poetics of second-person fiction could “destroy the dream of a universal narratology” (314, qtd. by Herman 369) is the immediate reference here.

<sup>5</sup> The work of Manfred Jahn, particularly his two essays “Frames, Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives: Towards a Cognitive Narratology” and “‘Speak, friend, and enter’: Garden Paths, Artificial Intelligence, and Cognitive Narratology” (the last from Herman’s collection *Narratologies*) should also be noted here.

<sup>6</sup> Including Tony Jackson's "Questioning Interdisciplinarity," F. Elizabeth Hart's "The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies," and Alan Richardson's "Cognitive Science and the Future of Literary Studies."

<sup>7</sup> F. Elizabeth Hart's "Matter, System, and Early Modern Studies: Outlines for a Materialist Linguistics" is an example.

<sup>8</sup> He does cite Lynda D. MacNeil's "Homo Inventans: The Evolution of Narrativity" as an example of a "phylogenetic" account of human narrative emergence (382n.3).

<sup>9</sup> In the omitted parenthetical note, Herman points out that Bakhtin's later essay "The Problem of Speech Genres" adopts a different approach.

<sup>10</sup> In *The End of Ideology* and *The End of History*, respectively.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Slavoj Žižek's idea that the "'ideological' is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence" (21).

<sup>12</sup> And "Althusser's structuralism is a structuralism of *stasis*," as E. P. Thompson famously argued (5).

<sup>13</sup> An excerpt from an interview with Lakoff provides an example: "My really early work was done between 1963 and 1975, when I was pursuing the theory of Generative Semantics. During that period, I was attempting to unify Chomsky's transformational grammar with formal logic. I had helped work out a lot of the early details of Chomsky's theory of grammar. Noam claimed then—and still does, so far as I can tell—that syntax is independent of meaning, context, background knowledge, memory, cognitive processing, communicative intent, and every aspect of the body" ("Interview" par. 8).

<sup>14</sup> Including neurological evidence in his "Where Is a Text? A Neurological View."

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to many members of a literature department. My aim is to discuss various larger theories of teaching imaginative literature and their strengths and limitations rather than recipes of “how I taught Shakespeare to sophomores” or “two ways of teaching deconstruction to undergraduates.” Moreover, my choices have been influenced by more generalized studies of “expertise,” and by the still-growing body of work that discusses the teaching of imaginative literature through the lens of pedagogical expertise. I argue that these expertise studies are both useful and philosophically compatible with good humanistic teaching practices.

MICHAEL SINDING. “Inwit of Inwit” / 93

David Lodge’s latest books, *Thinks . . .* and *Consciousness and the Novel*, form a pair: a novel and an essay collection both confronting the budding scientific field of “consciousness studies,” exploring its challenging implications for traditional humanistic concerns. Lodge observes that literature, especially the novel, is often seen as providing the fullest representation and analysis of consciousness. He examines how novelists developed techniques for this purpose, and how their conceptions of human experience and self have evolved. Consciousness studies parallels poststructuralism in its frequent antagonism to traditional humanistic values, but Lodge sees scientific and humanistic knowledge as complementary, not contradictory. I suggest that, rather than complement, they might more fully cooperate. I sketch some ways to develop Lodge’s ideas about literature as contributions to the study of consciousness, using his books as examples.

JONATHAN GOODWIN. “Cognitive Storyworlds” / 114

David Herman’s *Story Logic* is an encyclopedic attempt to orient current narrative research in cognitive science. Herman argues that narrative should be considered as an element of cognitive science and not just related analogously to the study of other mental phenomena. Using a wide range of sources in narrative theory and cognitive science, *Story Logic* seeks to provide a systematic account of the “storyworlds,” or models of the represented worlds created in storytelling. I review the argument of each chapter of Herman’s work before discussing its relation to other current scholarship in literary theory and some of the possibilities and problems suggested by his approach.